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10.00-10.05 – Introduction from the Chairs 
 
10.05-11.05 – Invited talk 1. Mark Lawford. Stupid Tool Tricks for Smart Model 
Based Design  
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11.20-12.50 – Technical talks 
- Quanqi Ye, Guangdong Bai, Naipeng Dong and Jin Song Dong. ProRef: An 
Automatic Authentication Protocol Refinement Tool for Extracting 
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- Tom Bienmüller, Tino Teige, Andreas Eggers and Matthias Stasch. Modeling 
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Test Case Generation 
- Ahmed Al-Brashdi, Michael Butler, Abdolbaghi Rezazadeh and Colin Snook. 
Tool Support for Model-Based Database Design with Event-B 
 
12.50-13.50 - lunch 
 
13.50-14.50 - Invited talk 2. Kenji Tei. Assured and Correct Dynamic Update of 
Controllers 
 
14.50-15.50 – Technical talks 
- Manuel Toews, Marie-Christine Jakobs and Felix Pauck. PAndA^2: Analyzing 
Permission Use and Interplay in Android Apps (Tool Paper) 
- Rajiv Murali, Andrew Ireland and Gudmund Grov. A Formal Approach to Use 
Case Driven Testing 
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16.20 – 16.50 – Invited industrial presentation. Daichi Mizuguchi. A trial 
application of B method for an embedded device by constructing B 
model via UML 
 
16.50-17.40  – Technical talk 
- Alexei Iliasov. Safety Kernel for Control Systems Design 
17.40  - Close 
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Stupid Tool Tricks for Smart Model Based Design 
(Invited Talk) 
 
Mark Lawford 
McMaster Centre for Software Certification 
McMaster University 
Canada 
Abstract. Formal methods tools can be used to detect and prevent errors so re-
searchers assume that industry will use them. We are often frustrated when we 
see industrial projects where tools could have been used to detect or prevent er-
rors in the final product. Researchers often fail to realize that there is a signifi-
cant gap between a potentially useful tool and its use in a standards compliant, 
commercially viable, development process. In this talk I take a look at seeming-
ly mundane industrial requirements - qualification (certification) of tools for use 
in standards compliant development process for general safety (IEC 61508), 
Automotive (ISO 26262) and Avionics (DO-178C), Model Based Design cod-
ing guidelines compliance, standards compliance documentation generation and 
integration with existing industry partner development processes. For each of 
these topics I show how “stupid tool tricks” can be used to not only increase 
adoption of academic methods and tools, but also lead to interesting research 
questions with industry relevant results. 
 
 
 
 Assured and Correct Dynamic Update of Controllers  
(Invited Talk) 
 
Kenji Tei 
National Institute of Informatics 
Japan 
Abstract. In many application domains, continuous operation is a desirable at-
tribute for software-intensive systems. As the environment or system require-
ments change, so the system should change and adapt without stopping or undu-
ly disturbing its operation. There is, therefore, a need for sound engineering 
techniques that can cope with dynamic change. In this keynote, I will address 
the problem of dynamic update of controllers in reactive systems when the 
specification (environment assumptions, requirements and interface) of the cur-
rent system changes. I will present a general approach to specifying correctness 
criteria for dynamic update and a technique for automatically computing a con-
troller that handles the transition from the old to the new specification, assuring 
that the system will reach a state in which such a transition can correctly occur. 
Indeed, using controller synthesis I will show how to automatically build a con-
troller that guarantees both progress towards update and safe update. Seven case 
studies have been implemented to validate the approach. 
 
 
 
 A Trial Application of B Method for an Embedded 
Device by Constructing B Model via UML 
(Invited Industrial Presentation) 
 
Daichi Mizuguchi 
Atelier Corporation  
Japan 
Abstract. We are trying to apply the B method for the development of embed-
ded software for a safety-critical sensor device. We report our methodology, in 
which B models are constructed based on UML, and our outcomes. 
 
 
ProRef: An Automatic Authentication Protocol
Refinement Tool for Extracting Formal Models
Quanqi Ye1, Naipeng Dong2, Guangdong Bai3, and Jin Song Dong2
1 NUS Graduate School for Integrative Sciences and Enginerring,
National University of Singapore
2 School of Computing, National University of Singapore
3 Singapore Institute of Technology
Abstract. To ensure the correctness of the authentication protocol im-
plemented in a web application, formal analysis is needed. A key part in
the formal analysis is to abstract a formal model of the protocol from
implementation. To do so, a common method is to record the network
traffics of the authentication process and infer the formal model from the
traffics. However, the protocol directly derived from the traffics often has
many redundant parameters and cookies in the messages, an analyst of-
ten needs to manually perform fuzzing to the protocol implementation to
derive a refined model. The fuzzing process may require tens of thousands
of re-sending and comparing messages, and thus it is labor intensive and
consumes the analyst too much time and effort. Therefore, we propose
ProRef – a tool to automatically refine the raw network communication
messages for web-based authentication protocol implementations. This
tool aims to help security analysts derive refined models of underlying
protocols in web applications and to facilitate the formal verification of
the protocol implementations.
1 Introduction
Security has become an increasingly important concern in web applications. En-
suring security of web applications has become necessary and important. We
focus on a widely used functionality in most web applications – the authentica-
tion. Due to its preciseness, formal analysis is a promising way to verify whether
an implemented authentication protocol satisfies security properties [1].
Intuitively, one can record the communicated messages when logging into a
web application, consider the messages as the authentication protocol, and per-
form the formal analysis. However, there are often many redundant parameters
in the recorded network messages whose existence does not affect the result of
the authentication, for example, the cookies identifying the screen resolution,
the version of the client being used, the version of the operating system, etc.
These cookies and parameters may be meaningful to the entire web application,
but they are meaningless to the authentication. Keeping these redundant cook-
ies and parameters in the formal model makes the formal model unnecessarily
complicated and may cause timeout during verification.
However, it is hard for the security analyst to know which parameters are
critical to the authentication result. Especially, the protocol designer, the de-
veloper who implements the protocol and the security analyst of the protocol
implementation are often not the same person. Therefore, the analyst often needs
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to perform black-box fuzzing 4 to identify the redundant parameters. The fuzzing
procedure and algorithm are as follows:
1. For every message in the protocol, we first parse and extract the parameters
in its URL string, cookie headers and the data posted.
2. Next we remove one of the parameters parsed in the previous step and send
the new message with one parameter removed to the server.
3. The response from the server is compared with the original response (when
no parameter is removed) to determine if the message with a parameter
removed successfully triggers the same response from the server. If the answer
is yes, then the removed parameter causes no effect to the result of the
authentication. Otherwise, the removed parameter is indeed critical to the
successful authentication and thus cannot be removed.
4. After the process iterates on all the parameters, the fuzzing for that message
is finished and the same procedure continues with the next message.
This procedure continues until all the redundant cookies and parameters in
all messages are removed. Manual fuzzing is labor intensive and would consume
too much time of the analyst to derive a refined protocol model.
Therefore, we propose ProRef, an automatic tool for security analyst to refine
the raw protocol under analysis. Given a raw network message in the protocol,
ProRef can automatically check which parameters and cookies are redundant and
automatically generate the refined version of the message. We make ProRef as
general as possible so that it can be applied to different authentication protocols
of different websites. We have tested it using Facebook and Instagram and it
can successfully produce the refined authentication protocols for both of the
websites. Although more experiments are needed in the future development of
the tool, we believe using this tool in analyzing the protocol would bring great
convenience to the security analysts.
2 Running Example
In this section, we introduce ProRef with a running example, the Instagram5
login authentication protocol.
When ProRef is started up, a window pops up for displaying the captured
traffics. Then the security analyst opens the browser and logs in to Instagram.
Meanwhile, ProRef automatically records the messages exchanged between the
browser and the remote Instagram servers. Fig. 1a shows the interface of ProRef
with the recorded messages. Each message is a string of text with an ID at
the beginning. The messages are organized in a tree structure in the TreeView
tap showing the triggering relationships of the messages. The parent message
triggers the children messages.
4 Fuzz here is a terminology meaning that the security analyst handcrafts requests
and sends them to the server to test the protocol.
5 Instagram is a popular online photo sharing social network. It can be visited from
www.instagram.com.
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When the security analyst wants to fuzz a message, she can double click on
the message in the TreeView, and the fuzzing view interface in Fig. 1b pops up.
Then the security analyst double clicks at the space at Fuzzing view to start
fuzzing the message. When the fuzzing process is completed, the result message
is automatically saved in a plain text file. Inside that file, the original request
and the refined request are both saved in order to show which parameters and
cookies are removed.
(a) ProRef Tree View (b) ProRef Fuzzing View
Fig. 1: Interfaces of ProRef
(a) Raw Messages (b) Refined Messages
Fig. 2: Messages of Instagram Login Authentication Protocol
Based on the domain knowledge of security analysis, the login authentication
protocol for Instagram involves three critical requests (the messages that drive
the protocol flow). The raw messages of the three requests are shown as in Fig. 2a.
After the security analyst clicks on the three critical requests to fuzz them one
by one using ProRef, the refined login protocol is shown in Fig. 2b where many
redundant cookies are removed. The red boxes in the figures show the differences
between the raw protocol and the refined protocol. For the requests (messages
sent from User to Ins), it is shown in Fig. 2 that parameters “mid”, “ig pr” and
“ig vw” in the second request, and “csrftoken’”, “mid”, “ig pr”, “ig vw” and
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“ds user id” in the third request are refined. For the responses (messages sent
from Ins to User), it is shown in Fig. 2 that the parameter “mid” is attached
in the set-cookie command in the second and third response because our tool
identifies that this parameter dose not cast effect on the success authentication
of user and thus removes it from the request. However, Instagram server detects
the parameter “mid” is removed and thus resets it in the response.
3 Functionality
ProRef is an application layer proxy that can automatically refine authentication
protocols for web applications. It mainly contains the following functionality:
– Organizing messages: ProRef organizes all the communicated messages
in a tree view representing their triggering relations. Each message contains
a request and its corresponding response. The response to a request in one
message often contains triggers to requests in other messages. For example, a
response containing an HTML file often triggers the browser to request and
fetch images and Javascripts from the server. Therefore, the messages can be
organized in a tree based on their triggering relations. This tree contains the
protocol flow as well as other redundant requests (e.g., fetching images). Such
a tree provides security analyst a visualized way of viewing the protocol.
– Fuzzing messages: ProRef automatically identifies the redundant param-
eters and cookies in a message and automatically removes them to produce
a refined version of the message. This is the main functionality of ProRef,
which saves the security analyst much time of fuzzing the protocol.
– Storing the refined messages: After the automatic refinement process,
ProRef stores the refined messages in plain text. ProRef outputs both the
refined and the original version of the messages, so that the security analyst
can see which parameters and cookies are redundant and have been removed.
In summary, ProRef is designed to help security analyst refine the raw net-
work communication messages to recover the refined protocol in order to perform
formal analysis. It helps the security analyst to perform the repetitious fuzzing
process which saves the analyst much time and effort.
4 Design
The structure of ProRef is shown in Fig. 3. ProRef serves as a proxy between
the application under analysis and the Internet. It captures all the messages
exchanged between the application and the remote servers that the application
communicates with. ProRef contains three components: network, UI and core.
The network component has two units: proxy and message container. The
proxy unit intercepts the network traffics. It is built upon Fiddler [2], a web
debugging proxy. Fiddler provides the library which contains the main func-
tionality of a proxy and it can handle HTTPS [3] traffics of applications. The
message container unit stores all the network messages for analysis.
In the core components, there are four main units: the request generator,
the requester, the response compare unit that is built upon a third-part library
and the logger. Once the security analyst selects a message to fuzz, the message
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is sent to the request generator. The request generator generates an HTTP(S)
request with one parameter or cookie removed. The newly generated request is
sent to the requester unit and it is sent to the communication partner from there.
After being sent, the request goes through the proxy unit and is recorded for the
purpose of comparing with the original request. On receiving the response, the
requester unit compares it with the original response to determine whether the
removed parameter is redundant or not. For two responses, the requester mainly
compares their headers, cookies and HTML pages. For the headers and cookies,
the requester can directly compare their strings. If the request header or cookie
in the new response is different from that in the original response, it means that
the new request cannot proceed to the next step of the protocol, and thus the new
request fails the authentication, i.e., the modified parameter is not redundant and
cannot be removed. As for HTML pages, the differences, caused by the dynamic
content such as the news update in user’s social network homepage, in the HTML
script string do not imply the failure of authentication. To determine whether
the differences between the HTML page in the new response and that in the
original response lead to authentication failure, we first use a third-party library
named HtmlDiff [4] to show all the differences in the HTML pages, and then
calculate the percentage of the difference. We consider the authentication fails if
the difference exceeds certain percentage. Currently, we set the threshold value
to 5%, i.e., more than 5% would lead to failure of comparison. The setting of the
threshold percentage is empirical and there is not a ground standard for setting
the threshold. More experiments are possible to derive a better value for the
threshold. The above process in the requester unit iterates until no parameter or
cookie can be removed, i.e., the refined message is obtained. Finally, the refined
version of the message is written to the disk by the logger unit.
Fig. 3: Structure of ProRef
The UI component consists of two units: the tree view unit and the fuzzing
view unit. The tree view unit displays all the messages in a tree view showing the
triggering relations between the messages. For the triggering relations, first, if
the request in a message has referer header [5], then the message is a child of the
nearest earlier message that contains the request to the same URL in the referer
header; second, if the response of a message is of status 302 redirection [5], then
the message is the parent of the nearest later message that contains the request
to the redirected URL. The proxy unit gives every message an unique number
as its identity. The ordering of the identity numbers captures the chronological
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sequences of the appearance of the messages. Smaller numbers mean that the
messages appear earlier and larger ones indicate that the messages appear later.
The fuzzing view shows information on how ProRef works during fuzzing process.
5 Limitation and Comparison
ProRef is open-source and free to download. The full installation instruction and
pre-requisite environment of ProRef are available online [6].
Limitations. The limitations of ProRef are as follows:
– Currently the tree view is not 100% correct. Some of the requests are trig-
gered by Javascript on certain events and the referer headers of those re-
quests can be optionally deleted since referer headers may leak private in-
formation [7]. In this case, the parent-child relation between two messages is
missing. Thus, the child message becomes the root of a new tree. Therefore,
there may exist the situation that there are more than one root in the tree
view. However, this problem will not affect the refinement functionality of
ProRef as it does not rely on the parent-children relationships to perform
the fuzzing. It only affects the security analysts as they might be confused
as they can not find the parents of these messages without headers. One
possible solution to address this problem is to introduce data dependency to
determine the triggering relations.
– Security analyst needs to manually select the critical messages for the pro-
tocol. Due to the previous limitation, we did not implement the feature of
automatically selecting critical messages for the protocol. We leave this part
as our future work.
– Not all the messages are repeatable. For example, if the login authentication
protocol implements an anti-bot system such as CAPTCHA [8], then the
messages cannot be repeated automatically. To solve this limitation, more
sophisticated strategy such as pattern recognition needs to be applied.
Comparison. Many protocol fuzzers have been developed. Most of them serve dif-
ferent purposes from the one proposed in this paper. Most of the prior developed
tools aim at automatically detecting bugs and vulnerabilities of the web applica-
tions or protocols. They use various strategies to generate the inputs which are
used to test the web applications or protocols. One of such tools is AspFuzz [9].
Similar to our tool, AspFuzz targets at the application layer protocol. To fuzz a
web application, it automatically generates anomalous messages by twisting the
format and the order of the messages exchanged in the protocol. However, this
tool aims at automatically detecting bugs and vulnerabilities instead of refining
the protocol messages to derive a refined protocol. Sudhodanan et al. propose a
framework that is built upon OWASP ZAP to automatically test the web appli-
cations for vulnerabilities [10]. First, security experts summarize attack patterns
based on literature and the known attacks, then, by configuring and recording
the normal traffics from the application under fuzz/test, their tool automatically
infers which attack pattern can be applied and lastly the tool automatically per-
forms the fuzzing/testing to the application. Unlike our tool, the traces their
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tool records are used to perform the inference to match the attack patterns and
the fuzzings/testings are mainly to confirm the success of the attacks. While our
tool records the traces for comparing with the responses of the fuzzing messages
and our tool performs the fuzzing to uncover the refined protocol.
Other tools are mainly proxy debugger applications like Burp Suit [11] and
Fiddler [2]. Burpsuit is not an open-source software like ours and its main func-
tionality is to record application layer traffics and it allows the user to manually
repeat or modify the messages. It can also serves as a web application scanner
and intruder. Our tool is not doing the same thing as Burp Suit. Although our
tool also needs to record the network traffics and perform fuzzing to web appli-
cations, our tool mainly focuses on refining the protocol. Fiddler, similar to Burp
Suit, can help developers to test their web applications and it supports manu-
ally fuzzing of an protocol. ProRef is built upon Fiddler and provides further
functionality – automatically fuzzing to refine the messages.
6 Conclusion
A refined authentication protocol without redundant parameters and cookies in
messages is needed for building the formal model of the protocol. To derive a re-
fined version, the security analysts need to manually fuzz the protocol, which is a
tedious and time consuming work. We propose ProRef which can help the secu-
rity analysts to automate the fuzzing process and generate the refined messages
in the protocol. This tool can save the researchers and security analysts much
time and effort from manually fuzzing protocol. ProRef is open-sourced with the
instructions for installation, demo usage and case studies available online [6].
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Modeling Requirements for
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Abstract. We present improvements of software development processes
based on formalized functional requirements. Fundamental basis is a
graphical formalism called simplified universal pattern allowing users to
model requirements using the intrinsic nature of functional requirements
specifying a trigger/action relation. The underlying graphical formalism
enables to generate additional benefits to existing processes. In this pa-
per we focus on two techniques: quantitative requirement consistency
analysis and automatic test case generation for functional requirements.
1 Introduction
Applying formal methods in software development processes requires formalized
temporal functional requirements being available. Even though prominent for-
malisms such as LTL or CTL [5] exist, enabling non-formal-methods-experts to
use them is still a major hurdle. Engineers need to be trained, stakeholders like
quality managers demand to understand what has been expressed, and avail-
able formal requirements need to be revised after a new iteration cycle of the
design has been initiated. Latest when it comes to real software production, non-
functional requirements such as readability, understandability, maintainability
become very important not only for the design being developed, but also for its
formal functional requirement specification. Moreover, the return on investment
for formal specifications may be doubted: does it pay off when we spend time
and money for establishing the needed skills and change our running processes?
Making formal methods applicable in production therefore means, first, to
bridge the gap between traditional requirements engineering and formalization,
and, second, to add value to existing processes which clearly overcomes return
on investment doubts.
In this paper, we address both of these key fundamentals: we describe the
graphical simplified universal pattern formalism to model functional require-
ments in a natural, intuitive, and declarative way. Then we put a focus on two
benefits: automatic requirement consistency checking and automatic test case
? This work has been supported by the ITEA3 project 14014 ASSUME.
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Fig. 1. Example of a simplified universal pattern.
generation for functional requirements. We finally present initial experiments to
prove the concept of our approach which is implemented in the commercial prod-
uct suite BTC EmbeddedPlatform R©1 for specification, testing, and verification
of requirements for Simulink R© and TargetLink R© models as well as production
code.
2 Modeling Functional Requirements
In the past, several graphical formalization languages have been proposed. Sym-
bolic timing diagrams [10, 14] or life sequence charts (LSCs) [2] are prominent
examples. Such formalisms offer tremendous expressiveness but this expressive-
ness comes along with needed expert knowledge to apply them. Approaches
like those presented in [1] (graphical pattern templates) or [3] (textual pattern
templates) limit expressiveness to gain better readability, but also benefit from
reduced complexity for tableaux generation for formal verification. Though the
latter two approaches use terms and notions to better understand the formalism,
none of them inherently bases on the nature of an informal functional require-
ment which impose another hurdle to requirement engineers.
With over 20 years of experience in the field of formal specifications we be-
lieve it is mandatory to directly relate the formalism to the intrinsic composition
of informal functional requirements. Furthermore, we believe it is important to
not overwhelm end users with exorbitant expressiveness, which will also lead
to better performance when reusing the artifacts later within formal techniques
such as formal verification or consistency analysis. Many of our customers’ func-
tional requirements for system components can be described using a simple trig-
ger/action relation, independent if they are expressing progress, ordering, or in-
variant requirements. The graphical language simplified universal pattern (SUP)
proposed in this paper follows this path of building a formalism on top of the
trigger/action relation. Note that approaches like LSCs or textual patterns could
either complement or enhance the approach described here. LSCs are well suited
to describe interactions between integrated components, while textual patterns
are charming as these are easily accessible to humans. Chronologically, SUP is a
further development from the graphical pattern templates [1] which have been
used in previous BTC-ES’ formal verification tools.
In the next subsection, we briefly recall the fundamental ingredients of that
graphical formalism. More details can be found in [13] and [12].
1 Product information can be found at http://www.btc-es.de/ under “Products”.
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Fig. 2. Tabular representation of an SUP run.
2.1 Simplified Universal Pattern
By long-standing experience and cooperation with engineers from prestigious
automobile and aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, description languages for
formalizing natural language requirements should be as intuitive as possible, easy
to understand, and preferably presented in a graphical way such that formaliza-
tion of human-readable to machine-readable requirements becomes a common
engineering task without being very prone to errors. The simplified universal
pattern (SUP) approach is based on the observation that the vast majority of
real-life safety-critical requirements for components can be expressed by tempo-
ral trigger/action relationships like in the textual requirement “If the driver up
or passenger up switch is pressed then the window has to start moving up in less
than 50 ms”. An SUP explicitly introduces artifacts like trigger and action to
close the gap between human intuition of a requirement and its formalized de-
scription, i.e. artifacts an requirements engineer talks about are directly reflected
in the specification formalism, as shown in Fig. 1. We remark that a trigger or an
action itself is not limited to be instantaneous but can have a temporal extent.
The semantics of an SUP is defined by runs, i.e. by (finite) executions of the
system under test which are observed by an SUP. More precisely, a trigger or
action is started by a run r at step i by consuming its start event from r at
step i and successfully passed at step j ≥ i by accepting its end event at step j
within the specified time interval, while its condition must hold in between, i.e.
for all steps k with i < k < j. A trigger or action fails during processing if its
condition became false or its end event was not observed in the time interval.
An SUP is fulfilled by a run r if its trigger and action are successfully passed by
r and their temporal relation is met. An SUP is violated by a run r if its trigger
is successfully passed by r but the action does not start in the specified time
interval or the action fails after entering it.
For a small example, consider the SUP from Fig. 1. One possible SUP run is
shown in Fig. 2: in step 1 the expression of the trigger condition Sa1 driver up
|| Sa1 passenger up holds as Sa1 driver up is true, and thus the trigger is
passed. The SUP is then ready to observe the action which happens immediately
as Sa1 move up is also true in step 1. The SUP is fulfilled and waits for a new
trigger. The next trigger is consumed in step 3 due to Sa1 passenger up. Since
the expression of the action condition Sa1 move up does not hold in the following
5 steps/50 ms (where one step corresponds to 10 ms), the SUP is violated in
step 8.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 3. Illustration of SUP coverage metrics: while Once (a) targets on finding one
fulfilling run, TEC (b), TCC (c), and TE/CC (d) aim at covering their corresponding
coverage goals being highlighted in blue.
2.2 Requirement Coverage
Explicitly revealing the intrinsic artifacts of an informal requirement through
a formal SUP enables to define intuitive and accurately measurable coverage
metrics for requirements. A commonly used informal coverage notion says that
“there shall be a single test case linked to a requirement which verifies it”.
Whether the linked test case is actually doing that is not obvious. It requires
a human review and confirmation. With coverage notions built on top of the
SUP formalism, the above informal coverage metrics becomes clearly defined
and measurable: executing the linked test case needs to generate a run which
completely traverses, i.e. fulfills, the SUP once, in particular successfully passes
the action end event.
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Even though we are free to define arbitrary coverage notions based on SUP
artifacts, we propose to use metrics first which only refer to the trigger part of a
requirement, thus yielding the notion of trigger coverage. Coverage of the action
part is left out but could be easily added. The proposed coverage metrics differ
in the degree of exhaustion a trigger needs to be covered in order to reach the
test exit criterion. Furthermore, we first restrict the coverage to fulfilling runs
only, i.e. an SUP needs to be fulfilled by a run to induce coverage at all.
Once coverage (Once) intuitively corresponds to a metrics “one test for each
requirement” and is achieved if there exists a run fulfilling the SUP.
The following more sophisticated coverage notions are defined based on a
variant of multiple condition coverage (MCC). MCC is defined on all the atomic
conditions occurring in an expression to be covered plus all their possible com-
binations. As the focus for requirement coverage is on fulfilling runs only, we
restrict MCC to a subset we call satisfying MCC (sMCC), containing all com-
binations of conditions for which the overall expression evaluates to true.2
Trigger event coverage (TEC) is based on the sMCC coverage for the boolean
expressions of the trigger start and end events of an SUP, while trigger condition
coverage (TCC) is focussed on sMCC coverage goals of the trigger condition.
Trigger event/condition coverage (TE/CC) combines both TEC and TCC.
For a coverage metric C ∈ {Once,TEC,TCC,TE/CC}, an SUP S, and a
set R of runs, we define the coverage measure C(S,R) ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R as follows.
If C = Once then C(S,R) = 1 if there is a run r ∈ R that fulfills the SUP S,
C(S,R) = 0 otherwise. If C 6= Once then C(S,R) = c/g where c is the number
of C-goals for S covered by runs in R while g is the total number of C-goals for
S. An SUP S is called fully C covered by a set S of runs iff C(S,R) = 1.
An illustration of above mentioned coverage metrics is given in Fig. 3. We
remark that an analogous definition is conceivable to establish the notion of
action coverage and moreover a combined trigger/action coverage.
3 Requirement Consistency and Test Case Generation
“Front loading” becomes more and more important. Hence, the quality of re-
quirement specifications is obviously of tremendous relevance: the higher the
quality of the requirements, the lower the probability of late iterations due to
inconsistencies and incompletenesses of these requirements and their derivate
artifacts. With formalized requirements using the SUP formalism and its con-
tained requirement artifacts we can support front loading processes by applying
dedicated requirement consistency analysis techniques on top of formalized re-
quirements. Roughly, the set of runs induced by each SUP can be brought into
relation to figure out, e.g., that requirements are contradicting. Then, the in-
tersection of runs would be empty. Additionally, as we have detailed knowledge
about each of the requirements, we even can give more quantitative information
about a common implementation of those requirements. Though there might be
2 In contrast to MCC, which induces 2n coverage goals for an expression consisting of
n atomic boolean conditions, sMCC induces 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n goals.
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runs that fulfill all requirements, parts of the requirements might be contradict-
ing. This could be made visible based on the coverage notions from Sec. 2.2.
3.1 Quantitative Requirement Consistency
In the literature, topics like requirements consistency, completeness and correct-
ness are quite rarely addressed in a formal sense. Survey papers like [4] show dif-
ferent informal but intuitive interpretations of these terms in different domains.
In context of formal specifications the term inconsistency frequently refers to
the fact that requirements are in conflict s.t. no valid system run exists, cf. [6].
The authors of [7] go some steps further and also take into account “whether
timing bounds of real-time requirements may be in conflict” leading to the no-
tion of rt-inconsistency. As requirements are often modeled by means of pre-
and post-conditions as in SUP, the term of vacuity [8] even considers conflict-
ing pre-conditions. In the following, we propose a new consistency notion called
basic SUP consistency combining the ideas of consistency and non-vacuity but
further incorporates a quantitative measure, namely by means of requirement
coverage from Sec. 2.2.
Let be given a set S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of SUPs. We say that some SUP Si is
basically SUP consistent for a run r wrt the remaining SUPs S \ {Si} iff Si is
fulfilled by r and the remaining SUPs S \ {Si} are not violated by r. We further
call Si basically SUP consistent for a set R of runs wrt S \ {Si}, a coverage
metric C, and a coverage threshold θ iff Si is basically SUP consistent for each
r ∈ R wrt S \ {Si} and the coverage measure C(Si, R) according to metric C for
the SUP Si wrt the set R meets the coverage threshold θ, i.e. C(Si, R) ≥ θ. We
finally define that a set S of SUPs is basically SUP consistent wrt a coverage
metric C and a coverage threshold θ iff for each SUP S ∈ S there is a set R of
runs s.t. S is basically SUP consistent for R wrt S \ {S}, C, and θ.
3.2 Automatic Test Case Generation
The SUP coverage definition straight forward leads to automatic generation of
test cases for functional formal requirements. Generating a functional test from
an SUP reduces to a proof task for a model checker claiming that an SUP can
not be traversed completely while taking the coverage metric into account. If a
corresponding counter witness exists, then this run fulfills the SUP and therefore
can be viewed as a functional test for the corresponding requirement. We remark
that within BTC EmbeddedPlatform R© we rely on model checkers based on SAT,
SMT, and BDDs, cf. [11] and [9].
For this type of automatic test case creation, different interesting application
scenarios exist. These scenarios differ in the definition of the “surrounding” of
a formal requirement for which test cases shall be generated. Theoretically, we
need to have a definition of runs available which describe the behavior of the
system under test. An obvious source of runs is the system under test itself:
a test generation takes only those runs into account which are induced by its
(operational) implementation. The advantage is, that the generated test cases
Modeling Requirements for Consistency and Test Case Generation 7
will be functionally reasonable. The drawback is that test cases are generated
from the system which shall be independently tested. Another option is to specify
the “surrounding” by a set of formal requirements constraining the set of runs to
a reasonable size – giving the advantage that the approach is independent of the
system under test and can therefore be initiated in parallel to an implementation
process. Here, the drawback is, that one is required to provide a “reasonable
amount” of formal requirements in order to obtain the desired functional tests.
4 Example
The main goal of any consistency analysis is to find out early if requirements
contradict with each other and hence to avoid that no controller can be built that
satisfies them all. In the one extreme, one could look for a tool which checks if
requirements contradict each other in every situation. This is probably the easiest
analysis that can be performed, but also leads to the weakest consistency notion,
since there could still be many situations in which more subtle contradictions
exist. The other extreme is a scenario where there would be no contradiction for
all situations (i.e. for every input or parameter combination in every temporal
order). This analysis and methodology is the most costly, as it requires both
the most computation complexity but also requirement refinement effort upon
detected inconsistencies.
We therefore strive for an analysis laying between these two extremes. We
propose to analyze formalized requirements encoded as SUP by means of basic
SUP consistency from Sec. 3, which facilitates a quantitative aspect of require-
ments consistency. As a nice side effect, this approach generates functional test
cases for requirements under consideration as mentioned in Sec. 3.2. For reasons
of space, we use the following syntax for SUPs throughout this section:
trigger︸ ︷︷ ︸
δtrigger
−→
∆
action︸ ︷︷ ︸
δaction
with trigger being the trigger condition, δtrigger the optional trigger duration,
action the action condition with its optional duration δaction, and ∆ the “local
scope”, i.e. the duration between trigger and action. A slightly extended form of
the requirement from Fig. 1 is thus written as follows:
driver up || passenger up −→
[0,50]ms
move up.︸ ︷︷ ︸
50ms
(S1)
We define a second requirement that shall enforce that the window moves down
for 50 ms at most 10 ms after an obstacle is detected:
detection obstacle −→
[0,10]ms
move down︸ ︷︷ ︸
50ms
(S2)
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Fig. 4. Results of basic SUP consistency analysis and test case generation.
The goal of our tool-supported analysis is now to check basic SUP consistency
of these two requirements to prove whether a correct implementation for them
is possible or not. In order to model the environmental effects of the actuators
move up and move down which might reveal a potential inconsistency of the
requirements, we need to encode relevant behavior of the environment. The
window moves up when the move up output is set to true and the end-stop
position is not yet reached:
move up && (window position < 0.4) −→
[10,10]ms
window position == min(0.4,
last(window position) + 0.05)
where last(x) denotes the value of x at the last sample point. In our example,
the sample time is set to 10 ms. It moves down when the move down output is
set to true while above the bottom:
move down && (window position > 0) −→
[10,10]ms
window position == max(0,
last(window position)− 0.05)
It does not move at the top, bottom, or when no actuator output is set:
(!move up && !move down) ||
(move down && (window position ≤ 0)) ||
(move up && (window position ≥ 0.4))
−→
[10,10]ms
window position ==
last(window position)
4.1 Automatic Consistency Analysis and Test Case Generation
We have implemented an automatic check for basic SUP consistency in combi-
nation with automatic test case generation within BTC EmbeddedPlatform R©.
In our example, we are particularly interested in basic SUP consistency of the
SUPs S1 and S2. As the triggers are instantaneous, we chose as coverage metric
C = TEC.3 The results of the automatic analysis are shown in Fig. 4: both
SUPs S1 and S2 are fully basically SUP consistent, i.e. even threshold θ = 1.0
is met, cf. table on the left. A generated test case for S1 is depicted on the right
of Fig. 4: after having pressed passenger up the move up signal holds for 50 ms.
3 Note that for instantaneous triggers, the expressions of the start and end events are
equal. This implies that the derived coverage goals are the same for both events but
are nevertheless reported separately.
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4.2 Towards Controller Integration
The above example showed that basic SUP consistency defines a reasonable no-
tion of requirement consistency. One obtains the information that a controller
implementation exists for an analyzed set of requirements. Complementary, func-
tional tests measurably covering requirements are automatically generated.
On the other hand, the example also shows limitations of basic SUP consis-
tency. Even though the specified requirements are proved to be basically SUP
consistent with 100% requirement coverage for the single requirements, there
could be still inconsistencies in which could lead to problems when implementing
a controller strategy for those requirements. In the above case, no controller ex-
ists which is able to handle some window-up request (driver up or passenger up)
together with some obstacle detection (detection obstacle). Please note that this
type of inconsistency is an intuitive one and requires human validation – no au-
tomatism can judge whether it describes a relevant scenario, i.e. whether a con-
troller implementation needs to deal with the mentioned inconsistent cases. It
could be guaranteed by the integration of the controller that detected input in-
consistencies can not occur. Here, computed inconsistencies would be irrelevant
for a subsequent controller design and could be ignored.
It would be beneficial to have another notion of consistency available which
is able to reveal potential inconsistencies based on specific input valuations as
mentioned above. From a controller’s perspective, we want to know whether
constraints to its integration exist. To enable this, we reuse the notion of basic
SUP consistency. The only addition is to derive a dedicated SUP which combines
all triggers of the defined functional SUPs in order to express a context-free
integration of the controller to be implemented. This additional SUP is called
integrity SUP and is defined as follows:
trigger1 || . . . || triggern −→ 1︸︷︷︸
δaction
Applying test case generation for this integrity SUP requires to check all sMCC-
combinations of all the SUP triggers of interest. If for some combination no
run exists then this shows either demands on a controller’s integration or an
unwanted inconsistency has been detected. We need to remark that the current
definition of an integrity SUP is only applicable if the triggers of the SUPs of
interest are instantaneous. Moreover, the time duration δaction need by given
which currently is a manual task. In future work, we will thoroughly investigate
the notion as well as the automatic derivation of integrity SUPs.
When considering the SUPs S1 and S2 of interest. Then, we can derive the
integrity SUP S3:
(passenger up ||driver up) || (detection obstacle) −→ 1︸︷︷︸
100ms
(S3)
The result of the automatic consistency analysis for S3 is given in Fig. 5. It
actually turned out that 6 of the 14 coverage goal are unreachable and thus
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Fig. 5. Results of basic SUP consistency analysis for integrity SUP S3.
conflicts in behavior of the requirements are revealed. Due to the fact that the
expressions of the trigger start and event event are equal (and thus their cover-
age goals), there are three conflicting situations remaining, namely exactly these
with some window-up request together with some obstacle detection, more pre-
cisely (1) passenger up && !driver up && detection obstacle, (2) !passenger up
&& driver up && detection obstacle, and (3) passenger up && driver up &&
detection obstacle. Based on this information, one can see that the simultaneous
occurrence of passenger up or driver up with an obstacle detection causes situ-
ations in which no control strategy can satisfy both requirements. Based on this
information, some kind of refinement can be performed, e.g. by relaxing the first
requirement to enforce window movement only in case no obstacle is detected.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented improvements of software development processes
based on formalized functional requirements. Fundamental basis is a graphi-
cal formalism called simplified universal pattern (SUP), which enables users to
model requirements using the intrinsic nature of functional requirements spec-
ifying a trigger/action relation. The underlying graphical formalism enables to
generate additional benefit to existing processes. In this paper we focused on
two methods, namely requirement consistency analysis and automatic test case
generation for functional requirements, and proved the concept of these tech-
niques by an example. In particular, when it comes to consistency analysis we
motivated the necessity of introducing quantitative measures for being able to
rate also controller integration demands.
In the current status of the technology we see several extension links in the
future. Besides equipping consistency analyses with appropriate debugging facil-
ities, we think about adding further quantitative measurements such as amount
of runs fulfilling an SUP. We also need to consider completeness analyses of
requirements, giving evidence whether “enough” requirements have been speci-
fied. By working closely together with industrial users we will collect the required
feedback and needs and will let the tool evolve with respect to these needs.
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Abstract. UML-B provides a graphical notation for Event-B that en-
ables formal development in a UML style. UB2DB is a tool that trans-
lates UML-B models to relational database implementations in SQL. The
UB2DB tool is implemented as a plugin for Rodin, an extensible toolkit
for Event-B. This paper presents the current version of UB2DB that
translates the main components of UML-B class diagrams to SQL code.
The generated SQL code defines a database and provides procedures that
manipulate it. The UB2DB tool exploits the Eclipse Modeling Frame-
work (EMF) to realise the required model transformation. The current
tool provides the basis for a more comprehensive tool that will provide
support for a broader range of UML-B features and support a variety of
database components and constraints.
Keywords: Event-B, UML-B, Database design, Model-driven design
1 Introduction
The design of database systems is an important field in software engineering,
and therefore it requires a verifiable and rigorous design approach. Event-B is a
formal method for rigorous specification and verification of digital systems [1].
It is supported by an open platform called Rodin [2]. UML-B is a graphical
notation for formal modeling in Event-B that is based on UML [10]. A tool,
called iUML-B, is provided which supports building UML-B diagrams in Rodin
and is integrated in an Event-B machine or context. The iUML-B tool is based
on the Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) for Event-B [11]. The Eclipse Mod-
eling Framework (EMF) is a framework for tools development which provides
modeling and code generation facilities [12].
The UB2DB (UML-B to DataBase) tool enables developers to rigorously
model their database or database intensive application in UML-B for verification
and translate the model to SQL code. SQL is a relational database definition and
manipulation language [7]. The UB2DB provides an automatic generation of SQL
code from a model defined in UML-B in the Rodin platform. The generated SQL
will create the relational database structure using create and alter commands
and provide procedures that populate and manipulate the data.
Developers will model a database system in UML-B and verify it in the Rodin
platform to detect any inconsistency or ambiguity. Then they will use UB2DB
to translate the verified model to SQL code.
2 Tool Support for Model-Based Database Design with Event-B
When modelling databases in UML-B, different refinement levels might be
introduced so that the model of database can be built gradually. In the first
abstraction level, an abstract view of the database is modelled and can be trans-
lated to SQL. In every refinement level, a more concrete view of the database is
modelled which adds more details to the preceding one.
UB2DB translates directly from UML-B and not from Event-B. Since UML-
B uses class diagrams, it is more aligned with the database as class diagrams are
commonly used to describe databases. Developers will benefit from being able to
generate Event-B from UML-B using the existing UML-B tool, allowing them to
apply formal analysis to their UML-B models. While the UML-B class diagram
clearly adds attributes to each class directly, Event-B list all variables together
without clear distinction of each class’s attribute. This makes it easier and more
straightforward to translate from UML-B to database than from Event-B to
database, and without compromising the model verification.
2 Translation process and approach
To translate from UML-B to a relational database, we designed our own meta-
model for relational databases in EMF. Figure 1 shows a part of the defined
meta-model. Each database is composed of tables, and each table may have
many attributes. Each element has a name associated with it. Along with the
name, attributes have types and constraints that specify if an attribute is not
null, unique or has a default value.
The first step in UB2DB is to translate the EMF representation of UML-B to
the EMF representation of the database such as translating a class in UML-B to
a table, or a class diagram to a database. A second step is to generate the textual
SQL code from the database EMF representation. For each UML-B model, there
are two translations done, one to SQL by UB2DB, and another to Event-B by
UML-B as in Figure 2. These two translations are separate from each other.
Fig. 1. Part of defined database meta-model
Each element in UML-B such as class diagram or class has a unique name.
Classes may have associations between them that relate each class to another.
UB2DB generates the SQL statements that create a database whose name is
given by the class diagram name, and generates a table for each class in the
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Fig. 2. Translation from UML-B model to Event-B and database
model. The associations between classes are translated to relations between ta-
bles. Each class attribute in the UML-B model will result in an attribute in the
corresponding table. Each component such as association or attribute is trans-
lated into a separate statement in the generated SQL. This way, dealing with
refinement will be easier as adding a new attribute for a class in a refined model
will correspond to adding only one SQL statement that adds that attribute to
the table instead of going through the whole process of creating a table again.
For each attribute in the model, there are some defined properties like total
function, injective function and initial value. These properties are translated
into constraints in the generated SQL. A class invariant might be added to
constrain an attribute value such as a ∈ 1..100. Such an invariant is translated
to a constraint in the generated SQL.
If an association between two classes is set as functional, it will be translated
to an attribute of one of the tables. If the association is non functional (n:n
association), it will be translated to a separate table with references to both
classes/tables. An example of that is the association member pod between Mem-
ber class and Pod class in Figure 3. The UB2DB tool will generate a new table
called member pod with two references, one to Member table and another to
Pod table. The following SQL statement is generated automatically by UB2DB
which creates a table with the association name, member pod. The table has two
attributes: member id and pod id that reference Member and Pod tables.
CREATE TABLE member pod (
Member id INT,
Pod id INT,
PRIMARYKEY ( Member id , Pod id ) ,
FOREIGN KEY ( Member id ) REFERENCES Member( Member id ) ,
FOREIGN KEY ( Pod id ) REFERENCES Pod( Pod id )
) ;
UML-B provides three kinds of events; constructor, destructor and normal.
A constructor event should be selected for events that aim to create an instance
of a class. Destructor is used for the opposite. For other operations, the normal
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event is selected where it adds a guard automatically to check that the instance to
select or update is an element of that class set. Each constructor event in UML-B
is translated by UB2DB into a procedure with the insert into table statement
in SQL. The procedure takes all class attributes and associations as parameters
for the insertion. Destructor events are translated into procedure with the delete
from table statement in SQL. Normal events are translated into procedures with
an update table statement if the event has an override operator, or to a select
from statement if the event does not have an action.
UB2DB generates SQL code in which class invariants are translated to con-
straints in the generated code. Event guards are also maintained by the transla-
tion to ensure correct implementations of the UML-B models. Also, the generated
code ensures the atomicity of an event by translating all actions to one atomic
transaction.
The UB2DB translation is implemented using a generic EMF translation
plugin which is provided by University of Southampton. Translation and rules
are contributed using the Eclipse extension mechanism. For each component in
the database meta-model such as table or attribute, there is a rule defined by a
Java class to translate or map UML-B to it. Each rule in UB2DB has fire and
dependencyOk methods. The fire method does the mapping between UML-B
elements to database elements. In the translation process, dependencies must
be checked by the dependencyOk method before proceeding to the translation.
A table is dependant on a database which means it cannot be generated before
the database, and an attribute is dependant on a table. This also ensures an
ordering of the translation of different components.
3 Case study and evaluation
Two cases were built to study various components and relations of database
systems and to help identify good practice in modelling databases in Event-
B with levels of refinements. The first case study is a student enrollment and
registration system while the other is a car sharing system. After having these
two cases modelled in UML-B, we ran UB2DB on different abstraction levels to
generate the database for them.
Starting from an abstract model, as in Figure 3 for the car sharing case study,
where classes have associations but no attributes, the tool generates the tables
with one attribute as a key for each table. Then the associations are added to the
source tables as attributes that references the target table. As the same classes
will appear in another refinement level, the create table if not exists command
will create a table only if it does not already exist.
Further refinement of the model might include adding attributes to different
classes as in Figure 4 for the student enrollment case study. Another refinement
could add more detail to the model by introducing new classes and associate
them to classes in the abstract model such as the Booking class for car sharing
in Figure 5. Attributes and relations added in later refinements are translated to
the alter table command so that we can build on the previous generated database
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without rebuilding it. The alter command can be used to modify the structure
of a table by adding, modifying or deleting attributes or relations.
Fig. 3. Abstract model for car sharing case study
Fig. 4. Refinement by adding attributes in Program and Student classes
Fig. 5. New classes in refinement model
The generated SQL code was successfully imported in the database man-
agement system and all the supported database structures and constraints were
successfully generated. This includes generating intermediate tables and assign-
ing different constraints such as primary key, foreign key, not null, uniqueness,
default value and basic check constraints. Events were translated to procedures
for constructors, destructor or normal events. For any constructor event, the
tool generated a procedure with a name as the event name and took the class
6 Tool Support for Model-Based Database Design with Event-B
attributes and associations as parameters for the procedure. Destructor events
were translated to procedures with one parameter corresponding to a key for the
record to be deleted. Normal events were translated to either update or select
procedures. However, UB2DB does not yet deal with complex queries in normal
events in UML-B.
4 Related Work
Much work has been done in the area of formalizing databases or translating
formal methods to database applications. Barros in [4] translates Z notation
to relational databases with support for different operations and transactions.
In [8], Khalafinejad and Mirian-Hosseinabadi present a method for translating
Z notation to SQL and the Delphi programming language with no tool imple-
mentation.
Laleau and Mammar in [9] present a tool that refines a UML specification
into a B model and then to a database application. While their work is close to
ours, they do not translate to update and read operations or deal with trans-
action management. Our work will provide extra features than theirs such as
normalizations, design patterns, database security and translation to database
views.
Davies et al. in [6] use a model-driven approach to automatically generate
object-oriented databases with an extended version of B method and Object
Constraint Language [14]. We are interested mainly in the relational model of
database design.
Wang and Wahls in [13] developed a Rodin plug-in that translates Event-B
to Java and JDBC code to create and query a database. While, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the only work that translates Event-B to database appli-
cations, it has some limitations. The results in [5] identify major performance
issues as well as the issues with preserving database integrity as in [3].
5 Conclusion and future work
UB2DB is a tool that translate UML-B models to relational databases by gen-
erating SQL statements that build the database and structure its tables and
relations. The UML-B model is translated by the UML-B tool to Event-B for
verification. UB2DB provides support to translate different components in UML-
B model into code that can be easily imported in MySQL database and reserves
the constraints such as not null and unique. It also provides support for events
that create new instances of classes, delete an existing one, update its attributes
or select from one or more classes.
In future, full support for events will be provided which might translate one
event in UML-B to different statements in one procedures such as delete and
insert when moving a record from one class to another. As the current imple-
mentation of the tool translate an abstract level without looking to preceding
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abstraction level, the future plan is to make the tool look for the the specifica-
tion of a model and all of its preceding abstractions. The tool will extend the
support for class invariants. The future work includes looking at preserving nor-
malization when modelling in UML-B and defining design patterns for database
systems and supporting them by our tool.
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Abstract. We present PAndA2, an extendable, static analysis tool for
Android apps which examines permission related security threats like
overprivilege, existence of permission redelegation and permission flows.
PAndA2 comes along with a textual and graphical visualization of the
analysis result and even supports the comparison of analysis results for
different android app versions.
1 Introduction
Android uses permissions to protect access to sensitive data. To gain access to
sensitive data, e.g., via API calls, apps must declare in the manifest which per-
missions they want to use. During install time the user then grants the declared
permissions to the app. For a safe and secure app execution, the app’s permis-
sion declarations should follow the least privilege principle. On the one hand, for
each permission protected access the required permissions must be declared to
avoid abnormal termination. On the other hand, an overprivileged app declaring
permissions which are not required can e.g. be exploited by malware. While some
apps already do not adhere to least privilege [6], least privilege is not enough.
Although not declaring the permission, apps may get access to sensitive data
via redelegation [15]. Moreover, the set of used permissions may not be precise
enough to decide if an app does not leak sensitive data. Thus, one also requires
knowledge about information flows between permission protected statements.
Existing static analysis tools typically examine one of these three security
aspects while our tool provides individual analyses for all three aspects. Tools
like Stowaway [6], PermissionCheckTool [12], COPES [4], and Per-
mitMe [5] examine least privilege by identification of the required permissions
of an app and comparison with the declared ones. Thus, permission are classified
into three categories: REQUIRED, UNUSED, and MISSING. We think that such a
classification is not sufficient. Permission requirement must always be decidable
and the classification does not describe access via redelegation. First, we add
two further classifications MAYBE MISSING and MAYBE REQUIRED. Furthermore,
we extend the classification with an access type, direct, indirect, or both if we
? This work was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG)
within the Collaborative Research Centre “On-The-Fly Computing” (SFB 901).
Fig. 1. PAndA2 architecture overview
look at inter-app permission usage. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first who examine for an app and a given app set which permission are used
indirectly, i.e., via redelegation. So far, it is studied if apps are vulnerable to or
indeed execute a permission protected statement for another app, see e.g. [15,11].
Many tools, e.g. [14,8,2,13,9], exist which analyze information flow. Often, they
consider predefined or configurable sets of sources and sinks, sometimes a subset
of permission protected statements. Only BlueSeal [8], which computes flow
permissions, considers permissions as sources and sinks. Unlike us, BlueSeal
groups permissions into permission domains.
In contrast to many of the mentioned tools, our tool also provides a graphical
representation of the result. To support the developer in its learning process, but
do not bother an (inexperienced) app user with too many details, the user can
select a more detailed view on the result or filter the result for certain aspects.
To better grasp the impact of a change/update of an app our tool can load a
previous analysis result and compare it with the analysis result of an updated
version of the app.
2 PAndA2
PAndA2 (Paderborn Android App Analysis)1 is a static analysis framework
for android apps provided as apk files. It is built on top of the Soot analysis
framework [10] which we use to built the intermediate representation of an app.
Currently, it supports three security analyses, see Section 2.1 for more details.
Architecture. Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of PAndA2. Generally,
it consists of three parts reflecting the three phases each analysis runs through.
In the first phase, the enhancement phase, Soot is used to get the intermediate
1 Available at http://pga3.foellix.de/?cat=downloads
Fig. 2. The graphical analysis result of an inter-app permission usage analysis is
displayed in comparison to a previous result.
representation. Afterwards, we add to every statement in the intermediate repre-
sentation which is protected by permissions the respective permissions. To know
which statement requires a permission, we consider a mapping from the Android
API to permissions. Currently, we use the mapping computed by PScout [3]
for Android API level 22. Generally, one could also use mappings produced by
other tools like [6,4]. Therefor, one simply must replace the permissions file.
Additionally, the enhancement phase extracts the information about declared
permissions and intent filers from the manifest file and computes a fingerprint
to identify the app. The fingerprint is required to relate an analysis result to an
app, e.g. when the result is stored.
Based on the collected information of the enhancement phase, in the following
analysis phase, the actual analysis, e.g. a taint flow analysis, is executed. Our
architecture of PAndA2 allows to plug in arbitrary analyses which only have
to implement a few interfaces such as a factory for creating the analysis itself.
Additionally any new analysis has to be registered in the tool. As mentioned
before, PAndA2 already contains three security analyses.
Finally, the visualization phase transforms the analysis result into human
readable and easily interpretable, graphical and textual representations. For both
representations the build-in client uses a HTML string or file. Furthermore,
different status messages regarding the analysis (result) are provided. Moreover,
the user has the option to save an analysis result for future comparison or review.
User Interface. PAndA2 comes with a graphical user interface as well as
a command line interface. Both UIs allow to configure the analysis to execute,
display messages (error, info, warning,. . . ) about the analysis process, and more
interestingly to view analysis results. Analysis results may be displayed in graph-
ical or textual form on a selectable detail level. Our detail levels are hierarchically
ordered, i.e., higher levels aggregate the results from lower levels. Most of our
analyses support a result representation per app, per component, per class, and
per method. To keep a useful result representation even on the lower detail lev-
els, we also provide filtering mechanisms which restrict the presentation of the
result to certain aspects of interest, e.g., a subset of the permission groups or a
subset of permissions like the subset of dangerous permissions. Figure 2 shows
the graphical analysis result of an inter-app permission usage analysis with detail
level COMPONENT but excluding permission group MAYBE MISSING.
Result Reuse. A saved analysis result can easily be reused later, e.g. it can
be redisplayed without rerunning the analysis or compared with a more recent
result (for an updated version of the same app). Figure 2 shows the screenshot
of a comparison which aims at illustrating the difference between the two results
and, thus, highlighting what has changed. To support reuse of results, PAndA2
can load and save analysis results. We use Kryo [1], an alternative serialization
API for Java, to save and load our analysis result. A loaded analysis result can
be processed as if obtained after analysis, e.g., it can still be filtered.
2.1 Available Analyses Plug-Ins
PAndA2 is shipped with three different security analyses. One of these analyses,
is a typical flow-sensitive taint analysis restricted to the analysis of a single
app. Our taint analysis follows the approach of FlowDroid [2] to compute a
single entry for the taint analysis and uses the approach of Hammer [7] to detect
the tainted flows. In contrast to many existing taint analyses [14,2,13], our taint
analysis considers all statements protected by permissions to be potential sources
and sinks.
The other two analyses examine the permission usage in a flow-insensitive
manner. One only considers the permission usage within the app itself, being
able to examine least privilege. Assisted by such a permission usage analysis a
developer can easily adapt its permission declaration s.t. it adheres to the least
privilege principle. The other also analyzes permission usage of an app across
app boundaries within a given app set, being able to detect redelegation threats.
To describe the permission usage of an app, both analyses group permissions
declared or used by the analyzed app into categories. Next to the three standard
categories REQUIRED (declared and used), UNUSED (declared, but never used) and
MISSING (not declared, but used), these analyses consider two further categories
MAYBE REQUIRED and MAYBE MISSING. A permission is added to one of these
categories if it is neither added to REQUIRED nor MISSING, it is declared, not
declared, respectively, and the app contains an intent which may target another
app with unknown permission usage or the app specifies an intent filter, i.e.,
the app can be called by another app. We consider the latter case because an
app should ensure that it has at least all permissions of the calling app to
exclude redelegation. For permission usage across app boundaries, we use an
even more fine granular categorization. The standard categorization classes are
extended by a tag, DIRECT, INDIRECT, or DIRECT & INDIRECT, describing if a
permission is only relevant within the analyzed app itself, if the permission is
indirectly accessed through another app in the environmental app set in the
sense of redelegation, or both.
Table 1. Real-world app results for permission usage analysis
App REQUIRED MAYBE
REQUIRED
UNUSED MAYBE
MISSING
MISSING MISSING
filtered
Adobe Acrobat Reader 2 2 0 170 1 0
Barcode Scanner 6 3 0 162 4 2
ES File Explorer 10 9 0 151 5 3
Google Photos 15 5 0 143 12 6
Instagram 9 3 0 155 8 3
Tiny Flashlight 4 3 0 162 6 5
WhatsApp Messenger 25 7 0 140 3 1
2.2 Limitations
Of course PAndA2 suffers the same limitations any static analysis has. Further-
more, we currently do not support user-defined permissions and ignore native
code of third parties. Moreover, we assume that components and especially apps
exchange information via intent-based communication. Exchange via shared re-
sources, memory or files is currently not taken into account. Additionally, we
cannot handle all types of intent creation, e.g., an analysis may fail to identify
the possible target of an intent. However, our tool will show a message to the
user if intents cannot be handled properly.
3 Evaluation
We tested PAndA2’s functionality, including all three security analyses, with
a set of manually created apps that are delivered with PAndA2. To study the
practical usability, we applied PAndA2’s analyses to a set of real-world apps
from the most downloaded apps in Google Play2. The goal of our selection is
to cover a large variety of apps with different purposes. We did not compare
our tool with the previously mentioned tools Stowaway, PermissionCheck-
Tool, and COPES because they are outdated and only support Android API
levels below 22 (the level we consider for our tool). Furthermore, a comparison
with PScout, which we use to detect permission usage, is not very meaningful.
During evaluation we recognized that the taint analysis still suffers from some
stability and performance problems. Thus, in the following we only present some
preliminary results for the permission usage analysis which was executed on an
Intel i7 2600 @ 3.4 GHz with 8 GB of RAM. Typically the analysis only took
several seconds except for WhatsApp, the largest app, in which our analysis suf-
fered from the huge memory consumption. Table 1 shows the detected numbers
of permissions per permission group. Note that on purpose we do not present
precision and recall metrics since it would be very laborious to manually infer
the correct permission usage from the respective Dalvik executable.
First of all, we observe that none of the analyzed apps is overprivileged
(column UNUSED always 0). However, for all apps we found missing permissions.
2 https://play.google.com
Some of these permissions have protection level normal and need not be declared.
The last column shows the number of missing permissions excluding those with
protection level normal. Some missing permissions often remain. However, this
does not mean that the app is unsafe. If certain statements are called in a
specific context no permissions may be required, but PScout did not distinguish
between calling contexts. Furthermore, all apps are calling other apps. Since
the permission usage analysis does not know which apps are called and which
permissions are required to call them, the analysis always outputs a high number
of permissions in the MAYBE MISSING category.
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A Formal Approach to Use Case Driven Testing
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Abstract. Traditionally, use case specifications are documented infor-
mally outside the UML model, often in a text document, with no struc-
ture or traceability to other UML modelling elements, e.g. actors, sub-
ject, dependency relationships, etc. This often results in inconsistencies
between the UML model and the use case specification, and introduces
a barrier to more automated methods for analysis. In this paper, we de-
scribe an approach that extends the UML model to enable use cases to
contain a structured use case specification. This extension is then used
to support methods to: (1) generate activity diagrams to visualise the
behaviour of the use cases; and (2) include our previous work on formal-
ising the use case specification with Event-B to support the generation of
test cases. An example of an Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) is used to
describe our approach. An implementation of this approach is provided
via a plug-in, UsecasePro, for the UML modelling tool Papyrus.
1 Introduction
UML use cases [1] are a popular technique used to define and communicate the
behavioural requirements for software-intensive systems. They appear in two
complementary forms: (1) a use case diagram that provides an easy to under-
stand illustration of use case modelling elements, i.e. use cases, actors, depen-
dency relationships, etc.; and (2) an accompanying textual use case specification
that details the behaviour and constraints for each use case. Unlike the use case
diagram that have their notations and semantics defined in [2], the use case
specification follow a loosely defined template [3] and is documented informally
outside the UML model. This limits the use case specification to only a review-
based analysis and permits inconsistencies between the use case specifications
and the UML model.
In our previous work [4], we combined the informal use case specification
with formal counter-parts to support an encoding to Event-B [5] that enabled
an early access to formal analysis tools. In this paper, we extend the UML
model to allow use cases to contain this use case specification, as seen in Figure
1, which aims to not only capture informal and formal counter-parts to support
the automatic generation of Event-B, but also explicitly capture the relationships
between the use case and other UML modelling elements, e.g. actors who play
a role in the use case, dependencies to other use cases, etc. These relationships
are used to support methods to automatically generate UML activity diagram
to visualise the behaviour of the use case. Furthermore, the generated Event-B
model for the use case is subject to the model checker ProB[6] that can be used
to systematically identify traces, i.e. execution through the use case’s behaviour.
These traces along with the structured use case specification are used to generate
test cases represented via activity diagrams back in the UML model.
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Fig. 1: Overview of approach.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background on UML
use cases and Event-B; Section 3 describes the extension to the UML model
to include a structured use case specification; Section 4 describe the automated
analysis methods for use cases, i.e. visualisation and test case generation; Sec-
tions 5 and 6 describe the tool implementation of the approach and related work;
finally, Section 7 describes the future work.
2 Background
2.1 UML Use Cases
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Fig. 2: Use case diagram for ABS.
Use Case Diagram. A use case
diagram for an Anti-lock Braking
System (ABS) is seen in Figure
2. It illustrates three key concepts
of UML use cases: subject, actors
and usecases [1]. The subject rep-
resents the system under consid-
eration, i.e. the ABS. An actor
specifies a role played by an ex-
ternal entity that interacts with
the subject, e.g. Driver. A use case
specifies functionality performed
by the subject in collaboration
with one or more actors in order to yield some observable result that is of some
value to those actors (or other stakeholders), e.g. PowerOn. The «extend» rela-
tionship allows for behaviour, e.g. PreventSkid, be added, conditionally, to the
behaviour defined in one or more use cases, e.g. MonitorBraking. The extension
takes place at one or more specific extension-points, e.g. ImminentWheelLockUp
defined in the extended use case. The «include» relationship is used when there
are common parts of the behaviour of two or more use cases, i.e. SystemTest.
3Use Case Specification. Each use case can be further detailed in a use case
specification [3] that capture a contract and a collection of flows. The use case
specifications for use cases PowerOn and SystemTest are seen in Figure 3. The
contract specifies pre-conditions, post-conditions and invariants that express
statements that must hold before, during and after the execution of the use
case, respectively. Each flow denotes a distinct sequence of steps that achieves
the given post-conditions. Flows are organised into the basic (or “ideal”) flow
and alternate flows that represent variations on the basic flow. In order to re-
duce the number of alternate flows, the basic flow can use simple branching [7]
using conditional or loop statements, e.g. if, else if, else and while.
PowerOn Intent of use case is to safely power on ABS.
Contract The pre-condition requires the ABS to be powered Off and not locked
for technician. The post-condition requires the ABS to either be pow-
ered On or remain powered Off and be locked for technician in the event
of a system failure being detected.
Basic Flow Driver provides power to the vehicle. System test is performed. If system
test reports pass (i.e. no component failures detected), then the ABS
is powered On, else the ABS is locked for technician and the display
switches on the ABS fail light.
SystemTest Intent of use case is to check vehicle health.
Basic Flow Health monitor performs a system test.
Fig. 3: Use case specifications for PowerOn and SystemTest.
2.2 Event-B
Event-B is a formal notation for modelling discrete systems. Event-B specifica-
tions are built using two elements: context and machine. A context defines the
static aspects of an Event-B specification, i.e. sets, constants and axioms. The
machine is the dynamic part that describes a state of variables that are first
initialized. Then events can be executed to modify the state. An event, named
evt, can be specified in the following form:
event evt = when P (v) then S(v) end
Here, the variables of the machine containing the event are denoted by v. P (v)
is a predicate denoting the guards, and S(v) denotes the action that updates
some variables. An action consists of a collection of assignments that modify the
state simultaneously. An assignment has one of the following three forms:
– x := E(v) (deterministic assignment)
– x :∈ E(v) (non-deterministic assignment from a set of values)
– x : | P (v, x′) (non-deterministic assignment using a predicate)
Here, x are some variables, E(v) denotes an expression, and Q(v, x′) a pred-
icate. Refinement is used to represent the system in different abstraction levels
and mathematical proofs are used to verify consistency between them. Event-B
modelling is supported by an effective toolset Rodin [8]. The toolset also contains
the model checker ProB[6] that can be used to systematically check an Event-B
specification for a wide range of errors.
43 Structured Use Case Specification
UML profiles [1] provide a generic mechanism for extending the UML meta-
model by defining custom stereotypes. In UML, a stereotype is a class and hence
can have properties that represent structural features, e.g. attributes of a classi-
fier. A profile uses a stereotype to create a new UML model element derived from
existing ones (e.g. a use case) appended with properties (e.g. contract and flows)
that are suitable for a specialised usage. In Figure 4, we introduce a profile UC-
Specification that provides an extension to the UML meta-model by extending1
the UseCase meta-class to have a stereotype Specification. This stereotype Spec-
ification includes properties that allow it to contain a contract, a basic flow and
a collection of alternate flows that reflects the template as discussed in Section
2.1. The contract is allowed to contain a collection of preconditions, postcondi-
tions and invariants, while the basic flow and the alternate flows are allowed to
capture a collections of steps. The application of this stereotype to the use cases
PowerOn and SystemTest from Figure 2, allows it to contain the specifications as
seen in Figure 5a and 5b, respectively, within the UML model.
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Fig. 4: Profile UCSpecification that extends the UML meta-model.
The classes in the profile, e.g. Invariant, inherit abstract classes2 that enable
them to specify properties such as a label, an informal description, a formal
predicate or an action statement. In our profile, this abstract basis enables the
pre-, post-conditions and invariants to specify a label, an informal description
and a predicate. For example, in Figure 5a the contract associated with the
1 An extension in the UML profile is denoted by a line with a black arrow head.
2 Abstract basis of profile: https://rajivmurali.github.io/UsecasePro/profile.
5PowerOn use case specification includes a pre-condition that specifies a unique
label P_Pre_1, an informal description of the constraint where the ABS must
be powered off, and a predicate abs_power = Off. The label ensures traceability
when transforming the specification into other modelling elements (see Section
4) and the informal description preserves the ease of communication that is ex-
pected in use cases. The predicate is defined using the data model associated with
the subject containing the use cases, i.e. the sets, elements, constants and vari-
ables. The profile UCSpecification allows the subject, e.g. the Anti-lock Braking
System, to have the stereotype DataModel that enables it to capture a collection
of sets, constants and variables, as seen in Figure 5c. A set can contain a col-
lection of elements to denote an enumerated set, e.g. SWITCH is enumerated
with the elements On and Off, as shown in Figure 5c.
Contract Label Informal Formal
Pre-condition P_Pre_1 ABS is powered off. abs_power = Off
Pre-condition P_Pre_2 ABS is not locked for technician. abs_lock = Off
Post-condition P_Post_2 ABS is powered on and the lock
remains off or the ABS has been
locked for technician and the
power remains off.
(abs_power = On∧abs_lock = Off)∨
(abs_lock = On ∧ abs_power = Off)
Invariant P_Inv_1 ABS must never be powered On
while being locked for technician.
¬(abs_power = On ∧ abs_lock = On)
Basic Flow Label Informal Formal Role
Action P_1 Driver provides power to vehicle. vehicle_power := On Driver
Include Ref. P_2 «Include: SystemTest» - -
If P_3 If system test reports safe then systemtest = Pass -
Action P_3_1 ABS is powered on. abs_power := On ABS
Else P_4 Else - -
Action P_4_1 ABS is locked for technician. abs_lock := On ABS
Action P_4_2 Display turns on ABS fail light. display_absfaillight := On Display
(a) Specification stereotype applied on use case PowerOn.
Basic Flow Label Informal Formal Role
Action ST_1 Health monitor performs system test. systemtest :∈ {Pass,Fail} Health Monitor
(b) Specification stereotype applied on use case SystemTest.
Data Model Identifier Elements/Type Initialisation
Set SWITCH (Elements) On,Off
Set TEST (Elements) Pass,Fail
Variable abs_power abs_power ∈ SWITCH abs_power := Off
Variable abs_lock abs_power ∈ SWITCH abs_lock := Off
Variable abs_systemtest systemtest ∈ TEST systemtest := Pass
Variable abs_faillight display_absfaillight ∈ SWTICH display_absfaillight := Off
Variable vehicle_power vehicle_power ∈ SWITCH vehicle_power := Off
(c) DataModel stereotype applied on subject Anti-Lock Braking System.
Fig. 5: UCSpecification profile applied on UML model of ABS.
6The elements in the data model inherit the abstract basis that enable them
to specify the following properties: sets and elements can specify an identifier
and an informal description; constants specify an identifier, a type (predicate)
and an informal description; and finally, a variable can specify an identifier, a
type (predicate) and an initialisation (action).
The specification can contain one basic flow and a collection of alternate
flows, each of which can contains a collection of steps. The profile enables the
alternate flow to specify the properties deviate and rejoin. These are used to
denote steps in the basic flow that the alternate flow deviates from and rejoins
to, respectively. Note that if a rejoin step is not specified then it is expected that
the alternate flow leads to the end of the use case. A full range of potential steps
are described as follows:
Action an action is associated with a label and can have two parts; an informal
description along with an optional formal representation. For example, the
first step in the basic flow of the use case specification of PowerOn has a label
P_1, an informal description of the action where the driver provides power
to vehicle, and a corresponding formal assignment vehicle_power := On. The
profile also allows the action to capture a reference to an actor in the UML
model that plays a role in performing the action (e.g. Driver). If no role is
specified, it is assumed that the subject associated to use case performs the
action.
Branch is used to represent either an if, else if, else or while construct in the use
case specification’s flow. It specifies a label (e.g. P_3), informal description
of a conditional statement (e.g. if system test has passed), a formal counter-
part via a predicate (e.g. systemtest = Pass) and a collection of sub-steps
(e.g. step P_3_1). During the execution of flow, if the conditional statement
is true, then the sub-steps of the branch are executed.
Include Reference allows the includes relationship defined in the use case di-
agram to be taken into account in the use case specification. That is, it
specifies a step in the use case flow where the behaviour of the includes use
case should be introduced. For example, the use case PowerOn includes Sys-
temTest as seen in Figure 2. In the use case specification of PowerOn, step
P_2 refers to the SystemTest use case via an includes relation.
Extension Point Reference a use case can contain a collection of extension-
points that are targeted by extending use cases via the extends relationship.
This step allows the location of the extension-point to be specified as a step
in the use case specification’s flow. This is similar to the includes use case
where the behaviour of the extending use case is introduced at this location
in the flow. However, the extension-points are optional. That is, the step
also captures a conditional statement that must be true in order for the
behaviour of the extended use case to be executed.
The profile UCSpecifcation not only provides a structured specification for
a use case but also provides a bridge between the conventional informal be-
havioural description an a formal counter-part.
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4.1 Visualising Use Cases
Activity diagrams provide an alternative to visualising the behaviour associated
with a use case [7]. Within the activity diagram, the steps of the use case spec-
ification map onto action notes which are partitioned by the actor or subject
that plays a role in it. Our extension of the use case specification to the UML
model captures important associations between use case and other UML mod-
elling elements that enables the automatic generation of an activity diagram.
Figure 6 provides the activity diagram produced from the use case specification
of PowerOn from Figure 5a. Labels are used consistently to ensure traceability
between them. The following describes the relationship between the notation of
the activity diagram and the use case specification:
Activity Partition represent the subject and actors that play a role in the action
steps of the use case specification, e.g. Driver, ABS, etc.
Initial Node denotes the start of the use case’s flow where the constraints of
the pre-conditions, e.g. P_Pre_1 and P_Pre_2, must hold.
Action Node represents an action step, e.g. P_1, from the use case specification.
Decision and Merge Nodes represent branching introduced by if, elseif, else,
while steps, and alternate flows from the use case specification.
Control Flows are introduced between nodes to correspond to the sequence of
steps in the use case specification.
Final Node represents the end of the use case’s flow where the constraint of the
post-condition, e.g. P_Post_1, must hold.
Activity diagram explicitly illustrate branching in the use case specification.
This is later used in the analysis to ensure that the test cases produced in Section
4.2 covers all possible paths of the use case.
Driver Health Monitor ABS
P_1: Driver provides 
power to vehicle.
ST_1: Health Monitor 
performs system test.
Activity: PowerOn 
Final Node
Decision NodeInitial Node
Merge Node
P_4_1: ABS is locked 
for technician.
P_3_1: ABS is powered 
On.
[P_4_Else]
P_4_2: Display switches 
On ABS fail light. 
[P_3_If: if system test is Pass then]
Pre-condition: (P_Pre_1) ABS is powered Off; (P_Pre_2) ABS is not locked for technician
Action Node
Activity Partition
Display
Post-condition: (P_Post_1) ABS is powered On and not locked for technician or ABS is powered Off and locked for technician 
Constraint
Control Flow
Fig. 6: Activity diagram from use case specification of PowerOn from Figure 5a.
84.2 Generating Test Cases in UML
As previously mentioned, a use case specification detailed with both informal and
formal counter-parts can be encoded in Event-B[4]. Figure 7 illustrates a snippet
of events from the concrete machine of the Event-B model3 produced for the use
case specification of PowerOn from Figure 5a. These events model the basic flow
in the use case specification. The encoding introduces an auxiliary control flow
variable, P_flow, to mediate the execution of these events to correspond to the
sequence of steps in the use case’s flow, i.e. event ST_1 is executed after P_1
due to includes dependency SystemTest at step P_2. The highlighted formulas
indicate notations derived directly from the use case specification.
...
Event P_1
when
P_flow = P_1
then
P_flow := ST_1
vehicle_power := On
Event ST_1
when
P_flow = ST_1
then
P_flow := P_3
systemtest :∈ {Pass, Fail}
Event P_3_If
when
P_flow = P_3
systemtest = Pass
then
P_flow := P_3_1
...
Fig. 7: Snippet of events from final machine of Event-B model of PowerOn.
Given an Event-B model corresponding to the use case, the Rodin provers
can then be used in order to verify the flows against the given invariants. As
discussed in Section 2.2, Event-B is also supported by the model checker ProB.
This can be used to simulate the execution of events, i.e. steps in the use case
specification, to search for invariant violations.
Root
P_flow = P_1,
abs_power = Off, abs_lock = Off, ...
P_flow = ST_1, vehicle_power = On, ...
P_flow = P_3,
systemtest = Pass, ...
P_flow = P_3_1, ...
P_flow = P_Final,
abs_lock = Off,
abs_power = On, ...
P_3_1
P_3_If
ST_1
P_flow = P_3,
systemtest = Fail,...
P_flow = P_4_1, ...
P_flow = P_4_2,
abs_lock = On, ...
P_flow = P_Final,
abs_power = Off, abs_lock = On,
display_absfaillight = On, ...
P_4_2
P_4_1
P_4_Else
ST_1
P_1
INITIALISATION
Fig. 8: ProB state space of PowerOn.
ProB can also automatically
find sequences of events, i.e.
traces, that lead to invariant vi-
olations. However, provided that
there are no invariant violations
this exhaustive check can be used
to generate all possible execu-
tion paths in the use case’s flow
(traces). Figure 8 provides the
state space produced by ProB for
the concrete machine of PowerOn.
Each edge in the diagram repre-
sents an execution of an event in
the machine and node represents
a reachable state (containing val-
ues of all variables in that ma-
chine) of the Event-B model. INI-
TIALISATION is a default event
in the machine that initialises the
variables to those provided in the
data model from Figure 5c. This
3 PowerOn in Event-B: https://rajivmurali.github.io/UsecasePro/ex/POn.pdf
9initialises to a state where the pre-conditions of the use case PowerOn hold. This
state space produced by ProB contains the following two traces, T1 and T2:
T1: INITIALISATION; P_1; ST_1; P_3_If; P_3_1
T2: INITIALISATION; P_1; ST_1; P_4_Else; P_4_1; P_4_2
The traces T1 and T2 are mapped to UML activities that represent test cases
named, PowerOn_TestCast_1 and PowerOn_TestCase_2, as seen in Figure 9,
respectively. These test cases in relation to their traces are describes as follows:
Initial Node represents the start of the test case. The constraint on it captures
the values of the variables, e.g. abs_power and abs_lock, that are associ-
ated with the pre-conditions, e.g. P_Pre_1 and P_Pre_2. Their values are
derived from the state after the execution of the INITIALISATION event.
Action Node represents a step in the test case. Each event execution in the
trace that correspond to action step in the use case specifications, e.g. P_1, is
introduced as an action node. These nodes captures the state of the variable,
e.g. vehicle_power = On, modified by the action step.
Final Node represents the end of the test case. The variables, e.g. abs_power
and abs_lock, associated with the post-condition, e.g. P_Post_1, and their
values found in the state at the end of the trace are introduced as constraints
on the final node.
Control Flows are assigned in the order in which the nodes are introduced. This
reflects the sequence of event executions in the trace.
Driver Health Monitor ABS
P_1: 
vehicle_power = On
ST_1: 
systemtest = Pass
Activity: PowerOn_TestCase_1 
P_3_1:  
abs_power = On.
DisplayDriver Health Monitor ABS
P_1: 
vehicle_power = On
ST_1: 
systemtest = Fail
Activity: PowerOn_TestCase_2 
P_4_1: 
abs_lock = On
P_4_2:
display_absfaillight = On
Pre-condition: (P_Pre_1) abs_power = Off; (P_Pre_2) abs_lock = Off
Post-condition: (P_Post_1) abs_power = On, abs_lock = Off 
Post-condition: (P_Post_1) abs_power = Off, abs_lock = On 
Pre-condition: (P_Pre_1) abs_power = Off; (P_Pre_2) abs_lock = Off
Fig. 9: Test cases for use case PowerOn in the UML model.
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5 Tool Development
Our approach is implemented via a plug-in, UsecasePro4, for the eclipse-based
UML modelling tool Papyrus [10]. UsecasePro supports the automatic gener-
ation of the UML profile, UCSpecification (as discussed in Section 3), and its
application to the UML model of a Papyrus project. Each use case and sub-
ject in the UML model is allowed to contain the stereotype Specification and
DataModel, respectively. UsecasePro is a successor of UC-B [9] by providing an
editor to author and manage the contract and flows of the use case specification,
as seen in Figure 10. The plug-in supports the automatic generation of activity
diagrams from a specified use case in order to visualise its behaviour. It also
supports the generation of an Event-B model from a formally specified use case.
Traces generated by ProB on the Event-B model, via a DOT file, can be loaded
into the plug-in to generate test cases represented as activities in UML model.
Fig. 10: UML modelling tool Papyrus with UsecasePro plug-in.
6 Related Work
Whittle [11] presents a precise way of specifying use cases based on a three-level
modelling paradigm strongly influenced by UML. He provides a formal syn-
tax and semantics of use case charts. Whittle’s use case charts are precisely and
unambiguously defined, and can therefore be executed. Savic et al. [12] have pro-
posed SilabReq a domain specific language for use cases specifications. SilabReq
helps to describe the use cases in clear and precise way through their custom
meta-model. They support the visualisation of use cases in state machine dia-
grams. Sendall and Strohmeier [13] described an approach that supplements use
case with operation schemas. An operation schema is a declarative specification
of a system operation written in OCL [7]. In comparison to these works, our
approach extends the standard UML model [2], via a profile, allowing use cases
to contain a familiar template of a use case specification that can be detailed
with both informal and formal counter-parts. The encoding to Event-B provides
an early access to formal analysis tools that supports test case generation.
4 Demos of UsecasePro: https://rajivmurali.github.io/UsecasePro/.
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7 Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we described an extension to the UML model allowing use cases
to contain a structured specification. We illustrated this using an ABS exam-
ple. This specification elaborated the relationships between the use case and
other UML modelling elements as well as consider a more rigorous approach to
its specification via Event-B. Automated analysis methods to visualise the use
case behaviour and generate test cases were discussed. We believe this approach
assists in reducing errors.
For future work, we aim to further extend UsecasePro to include the notion
of accident case [4] which can be used to explicitly state behaviour that lead
the system to an unsafe state. This could help better integrate safety concerns
early in the requirements engineering process for safety-critical systems. The
Rodin toolset supports tools that provide animation of the Event-B model. The
encoding of the use case specification in Event-B could be used to drive the
animation of the system. This could help stakeholder to better understand the
system being built at early stage in the development process.
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Abstract. We consider an alternative approach to the design of control systems in 
Event-B. We propose to structure a system into a one or more safety kernels, encapsu-
lating essential safety properties, and use the DSL-Kit extension to built control logic 
in an algorithmic notation with common control ow primitives and kernel actions as 
atomic statement. The result is then translated back into Event-B. 
 
 
